JUSTICE RUTLEDGE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES by ROCKWELL, LANDON G.
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
LANDON G. ROCKWELLt
FOR Justice Rutledge the law was an instrument of philosophy, of
life? and ultimately, of faith. "Justice is a part of life itself," he wrote,
"subject to the law of growth without which all is death. In this sense
there is confirmation of the idea that the principle of justice is eternal.
For it too is alive and must reach new levels and horizons, as man does
in all his higher aspirations." 1 Here is the common law tradition at its
viable best, logic tempered by experience and an abounding faith in
the destiny of man. In the continuing adjustment between the "firma-
ment of law" and the needs of democratic life, Rutledge's intellectual
faculties were infused with a personal humanitarian philosophy which
assessed the consequences of judicial decision in human terms. "Of
what good is the law if it does not serve human needs?" he frequently
observed to his law students. His judicial decisions, particularly on
constitutional questions, demonstrate this humanitarian largesse
which pervaded his democratic faith.
Roosevelt's eighth and last appointee to the Court, scholarly, self-
effacing Rutledge was the least known of any of them. At his death,
six and a half years later, he was still the least known and one of the
least appreciated of any of the Justices. He probably had more of the
qualifications which public opinion considers desirable for a Supreme
Court Justice than any of his colleagues. But public opinion has an
aversion to dissenting opinions and departures from stare decisis. The
high incidence of both of these among the Justices in recent years has
elicited much criticism. 2 This trend frequently has been attributed to
insufficient judicial, legal, or scholarly experience. But Rutledge, one
of the most active dissenters, came to the Court with a background of
four years as a federal judge and fifteen as a law school teacher and
dean. He respected precedent but he was not constrained by it. When
competing values and large questions of public policy confront a
Justice, faith and philosophy influence his choice more than the extent
of his judicial experience. For the judicial function is more political
than legal where broad constitutional issues are concerned. This is
best illustrated by the career of Justice Murphy, who came to the
Court with virtually no judicial or scholarly experience. He rose to
the Court on the ladder of a successful political career. Yet in his
voting record Rutledge was closer to Murphy than anyone else on the
Court. Murphy, the Justice with probably the most variegated
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1. Ru TEGE A DECLARATION OF LFGAL FAITH 16 (1947).
2. For commentary by a member of the present Court on the function of dissent and
stare decisis, see Douglas, The Dissentbg Opinion, 8 LAw. GuiLD REv. 467 (1948) and
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political career, agreed most frequently with Rutledge, the Justice
who combined judicial experience and scholarship more than any of
his colleagues. What determined similar voting behavior for these two
Justices of disparate background was a common philosophy, in the
light of which they interpreted the broad mandates of the Constitu-
tion. I
Prior to his judicial career Rutledge once commented, "I am not a
radical in any sense of the word, but I cannot remain blind to the ills
of the present system, and I am interested in seeing them remedied as
far as possible." For him the premises of democracy logically required
the growth of the welfare state. He understood and accepted big
government, yet he had profound respect for the dignity of the in-
dividual man. The two were not incompatible in his mind. He saw
nothing in the Constitution to preclude the use of extensive public
power. But to him the Constitution also spoke with an implacable
voice against government intrusions into the private domains of
thought and personal rights. He was, in this sense, a twentieth cen-
tury Jeffersonian.
To support his views on socio-economic issues his intellectual method
was essentially pragmatic. On questions of civil liberties, however, his
method of reasoning was largely a priori. Rigid, uniform protection of
civil liberties was for him very nearly an absolute general principle.
Intellectually his views on civil liberties were rooted in his convictions
concerning the basic premises of democracy itself, and these were un-
compromising. They derived also from an act of faith. For to Rutledge
the major premises of democracy were rooted ultimately in what St.
Paul called "the substance of things hoped for, the vision of things not
seen." "However guided by reason," Rutledge wrote, "choice at the
last must be intuitive, must be felt, or it cannot be complete. So also
must nations and societies choose and live by a faith. Else they die."
CIVIL LIBERTIES: PROCEDURAL
Concern for the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime
was second to none in Rutledge's judicial conscience. While these
rights have received vastly increased protection during the past decade
the Supreme Court has been badly split as to the extent of its jurisdic-
tion over state criminal procedure and the constitutional standards to
be employed. 4 A thin majority has espoused what may be called the
"fundamental rights" rule deduced from the commands of due process.
3. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 5 (1947).
4. For an analysis of the alignments thus produced during this period see PRiTcnTrr,
THE ROOSEVELT COURT, c. 6 (1948). For an analytic discussion of many of the cases up
to 1946 see Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13
U. OF Cni. L. REV. 266 (1946). A more general discussion of the issues to 1944 is to be
found in FRAENmE, OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES, cc. 10-17 (1944).
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Cardozo was the principle progenitor of the rule in .Palko v. Connecticut.,
There he articulated that remarkably influential dictum concerning
the "rationalizing principle" by which rights protected against federal
power in the Bill of Rights were to be selected for protection against
state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. Only those rights
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, . . . of the very essence
of a scheme of ordered liberty," reflecting " 'a principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental' " 6 were protected against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The "fundamental rights" rule thus contains a strong
tincture of subjectivity, despite its presumption of objectivity via the
catalyst of an assumed common concept of justice. By its own terms
the rule requires the Court to make an independent examination of the
record in each case. This has had the dual effect of increasing the num-
ber of applications for review and increasing confusion as to what the
law may be, since the Justices have been known to differ in their read-
ing of the same record.7
Against this view of the majority, a minority consisting of Black,
Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge has unsuccessfully argued for more
concrete and objective guides. The cleavage was polarized in 1947 in
the much discussed case of Adamson v. California.8 The defendant
claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment against federal action was made binding against the
states by the Fourteenth. The majority, speaking through Justice
Reed upheld the conviction on the basis of the "fundamental rights"
rule and precedent.' A concurring opinion by Frankfurter confirmed
the impression that he is the leading exponent of this rule.10 But in a
5. 302U.S. 319 (1937).
6. Id. at 325.
7. For an extended and excellent discussion of the development of this rule which the
author calls the "fair trial" rule see Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fouriccnth Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court, 46 Micr. L. Rxv. 869 (1948). Among other things, the
author points out that the uncertainty for state courts engendered by the rule produced
528 petitions for review from state convicts during the 1946 term. These constituted two-
fifths of all petitions for certiorari. Id. at 896-7.
8. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
9. Principally, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
10. Five months prior to the Adamson decision Frankfurter, concurring, had spelled
out the "fundamental rights" rule in detail in the notorious case of the electric .clair that
failed. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). With numerous ref-
erences to the Palko case, Frankfurter argued that the "Fourteenth Amendment did not
mean to imprison the states into the limited experience of the eighteenth century" by limit-
ing it to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Rather "the Fourteenth Amendment expresses
a demand for civilized standards" and the "consens of society's opinion." (Italics added.)
Id. at 468,471.
The case involved the issue of double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment.
The majority held that petitioner had been subjected to neither. Justice Rutledge dissented.
Probably Frankfurter's pointed re-formulation of the "fundamental rights" rule in
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thirty-page dissent buttressed by historical data Black bitterly at-
tacked it as allowing the Court "boundless power under 'natural law'
periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to con-
form to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes
'civilized decency' and 'fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice.' "" He thought such a formula should be abandoned "as an
incongruous excrescence on our Constitution." Instead, all the guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights should be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Douglas agreed with this completely. Rutledge joined a brief
dissent by Murphy agreeing with the Black opinion but with the reser-
vation that the Fourteenth Amendment was not necessarily limited to
the Bill of Rights. "Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so
far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to
warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process
despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." 12
Thus Rutledge read the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing the
entire Bill of Rights plus unspecified "fundamental standards" of
criminal procedure not included in the first eight amendments. Un-
like Black and Douglas, who desire to scrap the "fundamental rights"
rule entirely, he' desired to retain it as a supplement to the Bill of
Rights in his version of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to fill in
the chinks. This epitomized Rutledge's attitude on this strongest
article of his constitutional faith-to interpret the constitutional
shield of civil liberties so broadly as to leave no chinks "permitting
dubious intrusions."
With respect to this view of the Fourteenth Amendment his attitude
reflected interesting divergences from those of Black and Douglas.
Black's position entails more judicial self-restraint since discretion in
protecting procedural rights in any jurisdiction would be confined by
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. What Holmes called "the sovereign
prerogative of choice" would by no means evaporate but it would
operate in a narrower ambit than under the "fundamental rights"
rule. By retaining the rule Rutledge would have maintained broader
highways of judicial discretion than Justice Black-and partly for the
same reasons that Black would narrow them. Although Black is con-
cerned with establishing a more objective standard than the "funda-
mental rights" rule, he is at the same time an ardent defender of civil
liberties. Since the Court has not, in his opinion, sufficiently extended
essential protections to criminal defendants in state' cases under the
"fundamental rights" rule he would bring this about by his Adamson
this case was a major factor in evoking Justice Black's notable dissene in the Adamson case
five months later.
11. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947).
12. Id. at 124 (italic added). For extended comment on the Adamson case see Grcen,
supra note 7, at 892-910, and Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 268 (1949).
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formula. This formula provides both a more objective standard for
judicial review and a more rigid protection of procedural rights.13
And Black is willing to settle for this even though there may be some
loopholes in the Bill of Rights. Rutledge did not want the more ob-
jective standard at the price of the loopholes. Hence the "fundamen-
tal rights" rule to plug them. Thus he would have kept the rule for
quite different reasons from the majority of the Court. They, spear-
headed by Frankfurter, employ it not only out of deference to stare
decisis but out of deference to the right of the states to experiment with
various modes of procedure. To Rutledge, civil liberties were not the
stuff for experimentation.
Under Black's more mechanistic formula the Court would be re-
lieved of an independent examination of the record in each case. By re-
taining the "fundamental rights" rule as a prop, Rutledge's position
would have required this examination in doubtful instances. The
Court, in his view, should have no reluctance in exercising a careful
supervision over state criminal procedure in order to maintain stand-
ards logically if not literally required by the Bill of Rights.
For Rutledge the demands of civil liberties transcended considera-
tions of federalism. Latitude for the exercise of discretion by the
states on questions of civil liberties, therefore, played no part in his
conception of the federal scheme. He would settle only for a uniformly
rigid standard. Where personal rights were concerned he regarded the
Fourteenth Amendment as a great centralizing amendment. Other-
wise the vital protoplasm of democracy might be diluted. In this he
was guided by a frank value judgment. On this aspect of federalism
an a priori standard influenced his thinking rather than the pragmatic
one which dominated his approach to socio-economic issues.
The position he took in the Adainson case pretty much crystallized
Rutledge's views on the extent of the Court's jurisdiction over state
criminal procedure and the constitutional standards to be employed.
He ran a close second to Murphy in his insistence on rigid protection
of the rights of criminal defendants in both state and federal jurisdic-
tions. In the forty-six non-unanimous decisions involving such rights
which were handed down between February, 1943, and June, 1949,
Rutledge voted to uphold the right claimed by the defendant in 91%
of the cases. Murphy did so in 98%, Douglas in 78%, and Black in
74%.14
Since decision in these cases has turned on an examination of the
13. For a discussion of attempts to frame an objective standard of judicial review in
this area see Braden, The Search for Objectivily in Constifulional Lazo, 57 YALE L.J. 571
(1948).
14. Votes for the defendant in the forty-six non-unanimous cases were cast as follows
by these four Justices: Rutledge, 42 (20 dissents) ; Murphy, 45 (22 dissents) ; Douglas,
36; Black, 34.
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record in each proceeding, further exploration of Rutledge's position
requires comment seriatim on particular cases in the several categories
of procedural rights.
Right to Counsel. Rutledge voted to uphold the right to counsel
claimed in all of the fourteen non-unanimous decisions on that issue
during this period.' 5 Dissenting six times, he agreed with Murphy
throughout and with Black and Douglas in all cases but one.
The right to counsel in state prosecutions has been something of a
judicial football. The first Scottsboro case 16 extended this guaranty
of the Sixth Amendment to state trials involving capital offenses.
Later it was required via the Fourteenth Amendment for all indigent
defendants in any criminal prosecution whether or not requested.17
Still later applying the "fundamental rights" rule the Court backed
down from this position, holding that the right to counsel was not a
"fundamental right" essential to state criminal trials.' Except in
capital cases, where the Scottsboro rule still holds, the fairness of each
decision was to be considered on its own merits. This rule has persisted
as majority doctrine. WAThere the gravity of the crime and other factors
such as the age and education of the defendant,' the conduct of the
Court or prosecution, and the complicated nature of the offense charged
render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in in-
justice as to be "fundamentally unfair," the majority has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires assistance from counsel."
Rutledge believed that the right to counsel is fundamental in all
criminal cases. This followed, in his opinion, from the dual grounds
that the Sixth Amendment is made binding on the states by the Four-
teenth, and that even without such dependence on the Sixth Amend-
ment the very concept of due process alone requires it in most circum-
stances. Further, where counsel is not provided, prosecutions involving
"the indigent and ignorant who are unable to employ counsel from
15. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) (claim sustained) ; Tompkins v. Mis-
souri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945) (claim sustained) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (claim
sustained) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (claim sustained) ; Canizio v. New York,
327 U.S. 82 (1946) (claim not sustained) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (clani
not sustained) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) (claim not sustained) ; Gaycs v.
New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) (claim not sustained); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948) (claim sustained) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (claim not sustained) ;
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (claim sustained) ; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728
(1948) (claim not sustained); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (claim sus-
tained) ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (claim sustained).
16. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
18. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
19. See Reed's summary of the present dichotomy between the Justices on this ques-
tion in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
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their own resources and do not know their rights" deny equal protec-
tion of the laws.
2 0
When the majority in 1948 held that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not require a state court "to initiate an inquiry into the desire of
the accused to be represented by counsel, to inquire into the ability of
the accused to procure counsel, or, in the event of the inability of the
accused to procure counsel, to assign competent counsel . . .," 21
Rutledge joined the acid dissent of Douglas which pretty much sums
up the attitude of the minority on this question:
"In considering cases like this and the ill starred decision in
Belts v. Brady . . .we should ask ourselves this question: Of what
value is the constitutional guaranty of a fair trial if an accused
does not have counsel to advise and defend him?
"The Framers deemed the right of counsel indispensable, for
they wrote [it] into the Sixth Amendment. . . .Hence if this case
had been tried in a Federal Court appointment of counsel would
have been mandatory even though Bute did not request it. ...
I do not think the constitutional standards of fairness depend on
what court the accused is in. I think that the Bill of Rights is ap-
plicable to all courts at all times. . . .The basic requirements
for fair trials are those which the framers deemed so important to
procedural due process that they wrote them into the Bill of Rights
and thus made it impossible for either legislatures or Courts to
tinker with them." 22
Although no significant difference existed between Rutledge and
Black and Douglas on this issue, on one occasion Rutledge insisted on a
more rigid standard than they as to what constitutes effective counsel.
In Canizio v. New York 23 Black and Douglas thought that the de-
fendant had received adequate assistance when counsel was as-
signed partway through the proceedings after the defendant had
changed his plea. Rutledge and Murphy thought that the right to
counsel in each step of the proceedings was essential.
Self-Incrimination and Coerced Confessions. In each of the eleven
non-unanimous decisions involving self-incrimination during this
period Rutledge was the only member of the Court who was con-
vinced that a constitutional right had been violated.24 The "funda-
20. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947), where Rutledge concurred in Black's
dissent.
21. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,674 (1948).
22. Id. at 677-9. A year later, concurring in Gibbs v. Burke, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 1251
(1949), Black and Douglas flatly asserted that Belts v. Brady should be overruled. Rut-
ledge and Murphy merely concurred in the result, which sustained a claim that lacd of
counsel denied due process under the Belts v. Brady rule.
23. 327 U.S. 82 (1946).
24. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (claim sustained); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (claim not sustained) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596
(1944) (claim not sustained); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (claim made
1949l
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mental rights" rule and the position of the Adamson dissenters gen-
erally unite in forbidding species of self-incrimination which entail
coerced confessions. But Rutledge insisted on more rigid standards
than his brethren of what in fact constitutes coercion or self-incrimina-
tion. Thus in United States v. Bayer,25 the only case in which he dis-
agreed with Murphy, he thought that an initial confession conceded
by the majority to be inadmissible had sufficient nexus with a con-
fession of six months later to infect the second confession with self-
incrimination. He agreed with the view of the Circuit Court that the
second confession was the "fruit" of the improperly obtained first one.
In so doing he applied the analogy of search and seizure cases which
forbid the use of evidence derived from improperly obtained docu-
ments.26 The majority in rejecting this contention commented, "[A]
later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. But
this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession
under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the
confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been
removed." 27
A variant of this situation had arisen three years earlier in Feldman
v. United States.28 Here the compulsory testimony of a defendant in a
state court was employed to convict him in a federal court. Since such
testimony was not "wrongfully" acquired by the federal officers 21 and
since they had not elicited the self-incrimination, a majority, speaking
through Frankfurter, upheld the conviction. Rutledge joined a strong
dissent by Black which accused the majority of regarding the prohibi-
tion against self-incrimination with "grudging eyes and reducing its
by one of defendants sustained, by another, not sustained) ; United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532 (1947) (claim not sustained) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (claim
not sustained) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (claim sustained) ; Taylor v. Ala-
bama, 335 U.S. 252 (1948) (claim not sustained) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)
(claim sustained) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (claim sustained).
25. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
26. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The rule was first enunciated in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) that the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment
must be read in conjunction with the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth. Accordingly,
evidence seized "unreasonably" in the sense of the Fourth Amendment may not, under the
Fifth, be received in any federal court in evidence against the person from whom they
were seized.
27. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-1 (1947). Three years earlier the
Court had held, in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), that a voluntary confession
is not vitiated by the fact that a previous one (in this instance, twelve hours before) was
coerced. Rutledge dissented without opinion. Murphy and Black also dissented, although
they thought the second confession was admissible in the Bayer case. The difference in
time interval between the first and second confessions in the two cases probably accounts
for their position in the later case.
28. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
29. Relying on Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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scope to the narrowest possible limits." The dissenters felt that the
decision "cuts into the very substance of the Fifth Amendment. And it
justifies this result not by the language or history of the Constitution
itself, but by a process of syllogistic reasoning based on broad premises
of 'dual sovereignty'. . . . Constitutional interpretation should in-
volve more than dialectics. The great principles of liberty written in
the Bill of Rights cannot safely be treated as imprisoned in walls of
formal logic built upon vague abstractions found in the U.S. Re-
ports." 3o
Again in Malinski v. New York 31 the Court upheld the conviction
of a defendant based in part on evidence from the coerced confession
of a co-defendant. The conviction of the co-defendant, however, was
reversed. Only Rutledge and Murphy thought that the proceeding
was a single, continuous process, and that due process should not allow
a man to be convicted upon a confession wrung from another by
coercion.
Although the Court, under the "fundamental rights" rule, has re-
peatedly asserted that it will carefully examine the factual record of
the trial court, 32 Rutledge in company with Black, Douglas, and
Murphy insisted on a more careful scrutiny of the record than the
others. This was manifest with respect to the extent to which the
Supreme Court should weigh the evidence submitted to the jury in
state proceedings. Vinson, Reed, Jackson and Burton eschew this. 3
Frankfurter leans toward the view of the former group,3 4 although he
has not gone as far in insisting that doubts as to a defendant's allega-
tion of coercion be fully resolved by the trial court even though on its
face the contention appeared highly improbable.35
Search and Seizure. In leaving to the Courts the task of defining an
"unreasonable" search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment invited
30. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 498-9 (1944). Douglas also joined the
dissent Murphy did not participate.
31. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
32. For example, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) ; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329 (1941) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
33. See dissenting opinion in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607-25 (1946).
34. As in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), where he joined them in a
concurring opinion to give them majority status-albeit via the rationale of the "funda-
mental rights" rule. Three cases decided on June 27, 1949, crystallized, at least tem-
porarily, this division. Frankfurter's adherence to the Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge
bloc gave it majority status. Frankfurter wrote the opinion in all three cases: Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). See particularly Watts v. Itdiana, where he dis-
cusses the differences between the Anglo-American "accusatorial" system of criminal jus-
tice and the Continental "inquisitorial" system.
35. Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252 (1948), Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge dis-
senting. Black did not participate.
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unending disputation. For "the test of reasonableness cannot be
stated in rigid and absolute terms." 36 During his six years on the
Court Rutledge entered this semantic wilderness in only one opinion
of his own. But his voting record and agreement with dissents of other
Justices reveal his position clearly enough. In the non-unanimous
cases deciding this issue between 1943 and 1949 he thought the searches
and seizures in all but one of them were "unreasonable." 11 These
cases produced unusual alignments among the Justices. Frankfurter
and Jackson joined Murphy against the law enforcement methods em-
ployed in all of the cases in which they participated,38 whereas Black
agreed with this group only once.39 Douglas was the pivot point-
agreeing with the hundred percenters in five out of the nine cases.
The dissenting opinions elicited by the contentious decision in
Harris v. United States 40 express at some length the views to which
Rutledge subscribed. Frankfurter, Murphy and Jackson each dis-
sented in separate opinions. Rutledge concurred with both the Frank-
furter and Murphy opinions. The substance of these three Justices'
views is that a search is "unreasonable" when made without a warrant
issued by a magistrate's authority with "minor and severely confined
36. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947). For a discussion of recent
cases, see Note, Searches and Seizures: 1948, 15 U. oF Cir. L. REv. 950 (1948).
37. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (claim of unconstitutional search
and seizure denied) ; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (claim denied) ; Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (claim denied); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948) (claim upheld); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (claim up-
held) Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (claim upheld) ; McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 458 (1948) (claim upheld) ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S, 74
(1949) (claim upheld) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (claim denied)
(Rutledge wrote the majority opinion) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (evidence
obtained from an "unreasonable" search and seizure may be introduced in state trials).
All of the cases except Wolf v. Colorado involved Federal officers.
38. The solid agreement of Frankfurter and Jackson with the rigorous civil libertarian
position of Murphy and Rutledge in these cases marks a departure from their usual align-
ment. This can be explained on several grounds. In the first place, "the right of privacy"
occupies a high place in the hierarchy of values of both Justices. This is manifest in the
two sound-truck cases-Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), and Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949). In the former case Franfurter protests eloquently against "intru-
sion into cherished privacy." In his dissent in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
at 198 (1947), Jackson speaks warmly of the forefathers' concern for "that decent pri-
vacy of home, papers, and effects which is indispensable to individual dignity and self
respect." That a magistrate rather than a law enforcement officer should determine the
occasion for search is also quite consistent with Frankfurter's respect for the judicial
process. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947). Further, censoring search and seizure proceedings does not require Frankfurter
to sit in judgment on state court proceedings or state legislation-both of which he is
loath to do.
39. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
40. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The five-page majority opinion of the Chief Justice evoked
eighteen pages of acrid dissent.
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exceptions." The exceptions are limited to cases where a warrant for
arrest authorizes seizure of all that is on the person, or where objects
are in such open and immediate physical relation to a person being
lawfully arrested as to be considered a projection of his person.4 In
this view the quality of "reasonableness" is imparted to a search only
when inferences as to its necessity are "drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 42 A less rigid
standard, the dissenters thought, "can be used as easily by some future
government determined to suppress political opposition under the
guise of sedition as it can be used by a government determined to undo
forgers and defrauders." As well as having an eye to the future, the
dissenters assign great weight to past historic experience that was
written into the Fourth Amendment. Frankfurter is strongly convinced
that "[h]istorically we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution
which sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one single
factor gave rise to American independence." -13 To all of this Rutledge
subscribed. He also agreed with this minority that the command of
the Fourth Amendment is no less rigid when public rather than private
property is concerned.4"
Furthermore, to Rutledge the Fourth Amendment forbade evidence
from illegal searches and seizures to be introduced in state trials. With
Murphy and Black he dissented from a holding to the contrary in
Wolf v. Colorado.41 Without such a sanction the Fourth Amendment
was to him "a dead letter." In this case a gust of wind from past con-
troversy stirred, but not without profit for the dissenters. In the
majority opinion Frankfurter referred to the issue of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces the entire Bill of Rights as "closed."
Nevertheless, for the first time a majority of the Court asserted that
the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment "is basic to a free society. It
is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such en-
forceable against the states through the Due Process clause." Not-
withstanding this, Frankfurter asserted that evidence obtained from
search and seizures which the Fourth Amendment forbids may be
introduced in state trials because "most of the English speaking world
does not regard as vital . . . the exclusion of evidence thus ob-
41. As stipulated in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
42. Jackson for the Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)-a five to
four decision.
43. Frankfurter appears to assign the Fourth Amendment "a place second to none
in the Bill of Rights." See his dissenting opinion in the Harris case, 331 U.S. 145, 159
(1947).
44. Dissenting with Frankfurter and *Murphy in Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624
(1946). Jackson, who was in Europe, would unquestionably have dissented also.
45. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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tained." 46 Rutledge, while rejecting this last conclusion, felt moved
to toss a rather frayed orchid in the direction of the majority. "'Wis-
dom,' " he quoted, " 'too often never comes, and so one ought not to
reject it merely because it comes late.' Similarly, one should not reject
a piecemeal wisdom, merely because it hobbles toward the truth with
backward glances. . . . I welcome the fact that the Court in its
slower progress toward this goal [of extending the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the entire Bill of Rights), today finds the substance of the
Fourth Amendment 'to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . valid as against
the states.' " 41
In the only case where he thought a seizure permissible 11 he justified
it by the doctrine of "probable cause" which had evolved during the
period of national prohibition. Speaking for the majority he regarded
the facts in this case as analogous to those in Carroll v. United Stales,41
which held that a valid search of a vehicle moving on a public highway
may be conducted without a warrant provided probable cause for the
search exists. Jackson, Frankfurter and Murphy, more adamant in
their views on the stringent prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment,
constituted an unusual trio of dissenters in a civil liberties case.Y'
Composition of Juries and Jury Trial. Rutledge was willing to sanc-
tion somewhat more latitude in federal and state jury trial practices
than in other areas of procedure. In the eight non-unanimous cases
decided in this category between 1943 and 1949 he voted to sustain the
defendant's claim in five and to reject it in three.5 He dissented but
twice. Murphy voted to sustain the claim in all eight cases; Black and
Douglas in seven.
The present minority view that any method of jury selection em-
ployed by the states which excludes a portion of the community in-
validates an indictment or a conviction, even though proof of intent
to exclude is lacking, was shared by Rutledge. Thus he joined Black,
Douglas and Murphy in dissent in the two New York blue ribbon
jury cases.52 The Court had recently ruled that federal jury rolls
46. Id. at 27-8, 29.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
49. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
50. Jackson's dissent, in a self-styled "prologue," expounds the rationale of his search
and seizure views.
51. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (claim not sustained) ; Akins v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (claim not sustained); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946) (claim sustained) ; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (claim
sustained) ; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1946) (claim not sustained) ; In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948) (claim sustained) ; Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948)
(claim not sustained) ; Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948) (claim not sus-
tained).
52. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), and Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565
[Vol. 59: 27
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
must represent a fair cross-section of the community 3 but refused
to extend the principle to state practice. This refusal was based on
the dual ground that no intent to discriminate was revealed by the
records in the state cases, and a conviction that the Court ought to
"adhere to this policy of self-restraint and . . . not use this great
centralizing amendment [the Fourteenth] to standardize the admin-
istration of justice and stagnate local variations in practice." The
latter ground follows partly from the "fundamental rights" rule. It
also carried over from the field of social legislation to that of civil
liberties Brandeis' classic plea for tolerance of state experimentation. 4
The minority, however, felt that the lack of intent to discriminate
merely made it difficult to prove what was in fact "a very subtle and
sophisticated form of discrimination." Nor, in these circumstances,
did tenderness for judicial self-restraint prevent them from invoking
the prohibitions of the equal protection clause.
Rutledge accepted the majority view that the equal protection
clause does not require proportional representation of community
groups on juries. 5 In this he did not follow Murphy, who thought that
limiting the number of Negroes on the jury panel to one violated the
equal protection clause since the factor of color had not been disre-
garded. The only other case in which he voted to deny the claim of a
defendant that the jury was stacked against him arose in a unique
federal case. The defendant was convicted of violating the Federal
Narcotics Act by a jury composed entirely of federal employees-two
of whom were connected with the Treasury Department, which is re-
sponsible for enforcing the act. Speaking for the majority, Rutledge
held that the defendant himself was responsible for the final composi-
tion of the jury." The jury panel contained a fair distribution of pub-
licly and privately employed persons. But defense counsel employed
his peremptory challenges in such a manner as to eliminate all but
government employees.
In another case relating to jury trials but not involving the com-
position of juries, Rutledge rejected the contention that a directed
(1948), where the method of selection produced a special jury panel unrepresentative
of a cross-section of the community. No evidence of an intent to discriminate was
found.
53. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), where laborers had been
largely excluded from the jury lists, and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946),
where women were excluded.
54. New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
55. Alins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
56. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948). Jackson, Frankfurter, Douglas
and Murphy dissented. They thought that the dual standard of jury compensation in
the District of Columbia, whereby a non-government employee is paid $4 a day but a
government employee is given leave with full pay discriminated against the former.
Such a system, they felt, should be disapproved by the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its supervisory power over the federal courts.
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verdict offends the Seventh Amendment. 7 That amendment, he said,
is "designed to preserve the basic institutions of jury trial in only its
most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms
and details, varying . . . so widely among common law jurisdic-
tions." 11
The "basic institutions of jury trial," however, were more seriously
vitiated in Rutledge's opinion than in the minds of his brethren by the
Michigan one-man grand jury system. In 1948 the Court condemned
a summary conviction for contempt by a Michigan judge acting as a
one-man grand jury after a secret hearing. This, said the Court,
denied due process because of the secrecy of the proceedings and be-
cause the defendant had no reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
contempt charges.-9 Rutledge, concurring in the result, condemned
the entire one-man jury system as a travesty on the Fourteenth
and the Sixth Amendments. With strong adumbrations of Black's
Adainson dissent he deplored the Court's toleration of state experi-
mentation with civil liberties.
"This case demonstrates how far this Court has departed from
our constitutional plan when, after the Fourteenth Amendment's
adoption, it permitted selective departure by the states from the
scheme of ordered personal liberty established by the Bill of Rights.
In the guise of permitting the states to experiment with improving
the administration of justice, the Court left them free to substi-
tute .. . their 'ideas and processes of civil justice' in place of
the time-tried 'principles and institutions of the common law' per-
petuated for us in the Bill of Rights. Only by an exercise of this
freedom has Michigan been enabled to adopt and apply her scheme
as was done in this case. It is the immediate offspring of Hurlado
v. California . . .and later like cases. . . .So long as they stand,
so long as the Bill of Rights is regarded here as a straight jacket of
Eighteenth Century procedures rather than a basic charter of per-
sonal liberty, like experimentations may be expected from the
states. And the only check against their effectiveness will be the
agreement of the majority of this Court that the experiment vio-
lates fundamental notions of justice in civilized society.
"I do not conceive that the Bill of Rights . . . incorporates all
such ideas. But as far as its provisions go, I know of no better
substitutes ...
"Room enough there is beyond the specific limitations of the
Bill of Rights to experiment toward improving the administration
of justice. Within those limitations there should be no laboratory
excursions, unless or until the people have authorized them by the
57. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
58. Black, Douglas and Murphy, dissenting, deplored the practice of directed ver-
dicts since the trial of fact by juries rather than judges is an essential bulwark of civil
liberties. They thought the decision a judicial erosion of the Seventh Amendment,
59. it re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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constitutionally provided method. This is no time to experiment
with established liberties." 60
Exhaustion of State Remedies. Consistent with his vigilant solicitude
for the rights of criminal defendants, Rutledge advocated expeditious
procedure for Supreme Court review of petitions arising from state
prosecutions. The Supreme Court has ruled that it will not intervene
until state remedies have been exhausted."' Illinois law provides a
variety of remedies to one claiming a denial of a constitutional right
but fails to enlighten perplexed petitioners as to which may be the
appropriate one for them. Consequently, petitioners from Illinois
may find their state remedies inexhaustible, thus precluding a review
of the merits of their case by the federal courts. Rutledge castigated
this "merry-go-round." 62 "The Illinois procedural labyrinth is made
up entirely of blind alleys, each of which is useful only as a means of
convincing the federal courts that the state road which the petitioner
has taken was the wrong one." He thought that for Illinois the Su-
preme Court should no longer require exhaustion of state remedies
before permitting resort to the federal courts. "We should neither
delay nor deny justice, nor clog its administration, with so useless and
harmful a procedural strangling of federal constitutional rights." 0
This chicken came home to roost in a majority opinion the next
term of Court. The Chief Justice, observing that the exhaustion of
state remedies rule "presupposes that some adequate state remedy
exists," sent a similar case back to the state courts with the injunction
that "If there is now no post-trial procedure by which federal rights
may be vindicated in Illinois we wish to be advised of that fact upon
remand of this case." 64
Access to Courts. In Yakus v. United States,2 where the Court upheld
wartime price control, Rutledge thought the Emergency Price Control
Act afforded inadequate recourse in the courts for individuals who ran
afoul of regulations. He admitted compelling reasons for Congress to
balance the scales of litigation unevenly in favor of enforcement. But
the statute permitted an individual to question the validity of a regula-
tion through only one narrow, briefly open route. Beyond this route
no court was allowed jurisdiction to consider the validity of a regula-
tion. This, he thought, went too far. It not only denied due process
60. Id. at 280-2.
61. Ex parte Hawke, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
62. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
63. Referring again to this Illinois procedure in a dissenting opinion in Parker v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 578 (1948), four months later, Rutledge observed: "Constitu-
tional rights may be nullified quite as readily and completely by hypertechnical pro-
cedural obstructions to their effective assertion and maintenance as by outright sub-
stantive denial."
64. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
65. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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but infringed the independence of the judicial process in criminal
trials. "War," he wrote, "requires much of the citizen. Ile surrenders
rights for the time being to secure their more permanent establish-
ment. Most men do so freely. . . . But the surrender is neither per-
manent nor total. The great liberties of speech and the press are cur-
tailed but not denied. Religious freedom remains a living thing. With
these, in our system, rank the elemental protections thrown about the
citizen charged with crime, more especially those forged on history's
anvil in great crises. They secure fair play to the guilty and vindica-
tion for the innocent. . . . Not yet has the war brought extremity that
demands or permits them to be put aside. Nor does maintaining price
control require this." 66 With the lone concurrence of Murphy, there-
fore, he objected to this provision which forbade a criminal court
to consider the validity of the law on which the charge of crime was
founded.
Contempt. In the celebrated John L. Lewis contempt case,"1 Rutledge
pinned the burden of his lengthy dissenting opinion to an issue of pro-
cedural rights. In this he was joined only by Murphy. Action against
Lewis had mingled civil and criminal contempt charges in the same
proceeding. To Rutledge the Court ignored the vital principle that
"civil and criminal proceedings are altogether different and separate
things, and under the Constitution must be kept so." 68 A trial where
civil and criminal charges were "hashed together in a single criminal-
civil hodgepodge" deprived Lewis, Rutledge thought, of the more
rigid trial procedures guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. "In some
respects matters of procedure constitute the very essence of ordered
liberty under the Constitution. For this reason, especially in the Bill
of Rights, specific guaranties have been put around the manner in
which various legal proceedings shall be conducted ..... 1 [A]U the
Constitutional guaranties applicable to trials for crime should apply
to such trials for contempt, excepting only those which may be wholly
inconsistent with the nature and execution of the function the court
must perform." 70
Martial Law and Military Trials. Martial law in Hawaii during the
war came up for review in 1946.71 Rutledge subscribed to Black's
majority opinion which held that-in passing the Hawaii Organic Act
of 1900 -Congress did not intend to authorize the suspension of con-
stitutional guaranties of a fair trial.72 The concurring opinion of
66. Id. at 487-8.
67. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 259 (1947).
68. Id. at 384.
69. Id. at 363.
70. Id. at 374.
71. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). White v. Steer was decided in
the same opinion.
72. See Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law and the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J. 27
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Murphy which squarely invoked the constitutional issue by con-
demning the military trials as a violation of the Bill of Rights did not
attract Rutledge's adherence.
More significant for Rutledge was the Court's review of the habeas
corpus petition of General Yamashita challenging his conviction for
war crimes by a military commission.73 The Court found that the
Military Commission had authority under international law to pro-
ceed with the trial and in so doing did not violate any constitutional
command. Both Rutledge and Murphy dissented vigorously in
lengthy separate opinions.
Rutledge was deeply concerned that such military trials meet the
standards of fairness of Anglo-American criminal proceedings. To
him the record of the Yamashita proceedings made such a poor show-
ing that he felt constrained to protest.
"It is not too early... for the nation steadfastly to follow its
great constitutional traditions, none older or more universally
protective against unbridled power than due process of law in the
trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens,
aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents .... Every departure
weakens the tradition, whether it touches the high or low, the
powerful or the weak, the triumphant or the conquered." 74
The majority had ruled that under the circumstances, the Fifth
Amendment was not applicable. This Rutledge was unable to accept.
"In this sense I think the Constitution follows the Flag. . .. I
am completely unable to accept the Court's ruling concerning the
applicability of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to
this case. Not heretofore has it been held that any human being is
beyond its universally protecting spread in the guaranty of a fair
trial in the most fundamental sense. That door is dangerous to
open. I will have no part in opening it. For once it is ajar, even for
enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for other, perhaps
ultimately for all. . . . I cannot consent to even implied departure
from that great absolute." "'
Admitting that the "essence" of the Fifth Amendment's protection is
pretty hard to pin down, he thought the heart of it lay in proscribing
two things that had characterized the procedure of General Yama-
shita's trial:
(1947), and Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in
Harwaii and the Yamiashifa Case, 59 HAv. L. REv. 833 (1946).
73. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). For a full discussion of this case see Fair-
man, supra note 72. For briefer comment see W,¥right, Due Process and International
Law, 40 Ax. J. INT'L L. 398 (1946).
74. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41-2 (1946).
75. Id. at 47, 79-80, 81.
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"One is that conviction shall not rest in any essential part upon
unchecked rumor, report, or the results of the prosecution's ex
pare investigations, but shall stand on proven fact; the other, cor-
relative, lies in a fair chance to defend. This embraces at least the
rights to know with reasonable clarity in advance of the trial the
exact nature of the offense with which one is to be charged; to have
reasonable time for preparing to meet the charge and to have aid of
counsel in doing so. . . ., 7
In summary, then, Rutledge favored more extensive constitutional
protection of the rights of criminal defendants than any other member
of the Court except Murphy. No other Justice except Murphy
read the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing the entire Bill of
Rights plus "fundamental standards" of criminal procedure which
may not be included in the first eight amendments. This position, of
course, committed him to a vigorous exercise of judicial review where
procedural rights were concerned.
Consequently he was the only member of the Court during this
period who voted to sustain claims of criminal defendants in all cases
involving the right to counsel and self-incrimination. In all but one
instance he would have sustained allegations of unreasonable search
and seizure. Concerning jury trials his views were substantially the
same as those of Black and Douglas except that they would proscribe
directed verdicts. He was second to none in his advocacy of expedi-
tious procedures for review of petitions arising from state prosecutions,
and in his opposition to any commingling of criminal and civil actions
in the same proceeding. Finally, his view in the Japanese war crimes
cases was shared only by Murphy. For neither Black nor Douglas
assented to the proposition that the Constitution follows the flag in the
sense that the guaranties of the Fifth Amendment should have applied
to these cases.
CIVIL LIBERTIES: SUBSTANTIVE
Rights Guaranteed by the First Amendment. The leitmotifs of Rut-
,ledge's version of the First Amendment " were voiced in Thomas v.
76. Id. at 79.
77. For a general discussion of these issues and alignments of the Justices thereon
see PRrrcHurr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, C. 5 (1948). For a brief assessment of recent
developments see Cushman, Ten Years of the Supreme Court 1937-1947: Civil Liberties,
42 Am. Pob Sci. R . 42 (1948). See also FRAENKEL, OUR CIVIL LIDERTIES (1944)
especially cc. 1-10.
Concerning rights of free speech, press, and religion, Rutledge differed with Black
and Douglas only on rare occasions. But these differences cancelled out in the total
voting record. In some twenty-four non-unanimous decisions since 1943 where these
rights were at issue these three Justices each voted to sustain the right claimed in nine-
teen cases. Murphy's civil libertarian zeal elicited sustaining votes from him in all of
the cases but one (United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)). With respect to
speech, whether secular or religious, Rutledge, Black and Murphy voted to protect the
right unfettered in all the cases where it was involved. Douglas was contrary-minded
[Vol. 59 : 27
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
Collins.78 This is perhaps his most notable opinion. In the brief per-
spective of five years it appears as a distinctive high mark for the pro-
tection of civil liberties. The case arose from the action of R. J. Thomas
of the C. I. 0. in soliciting union membership at a meeting without
benefit of an organizer's card required by a Texas statute. To secure
the card an organizer had to give his name, affiliation, and show his
credentials, but no discretion was vested in state officers to withhold
the card. In holding the statute void under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Rutledge placed the stamp of established doctrine on the
then recently developed tenet that the guaranties of the First Amend-
ment occupy a preferred place in our constitutional scheme. In re-
viewing legislation alleged to trammel these rights Rutledge felt it
necessary for the Court to reverse the usual presumption in favor of a
statute's validity: 79
"This case confronts us again with the duty our system places
on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the
State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always deli-
cate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting
legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme
to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by
the First Amendment .... That priority gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 3
Under the clear and present danger rule, therefore, "only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation." This demands active and critical judicial review by the
Court. For although judgment as to where the line of restraint on free
expression may be placed "in the first instance is for the legislative
body ...in our system where the line can constitutionally be placed
presents a question this Court cannot escape answering independCntly,
whatever the legislative judgment ... ." 81
The opinion rejected the allegation that the guaranties of the First
Amendment do not apply to business or economic activity. "Great
secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. . . . [T]he First Amend-
ment is a charter for government, not for an institution of learning.
twice (Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944), and Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)).
78. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
79. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ; Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 8, 95 (1940) for
the beginnings of the doctrine. The phrase "preferred position' was actually first
used by Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 603 (1942).
It reappeared as majority language in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943),
and several subsequent cases.
80. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
81. Italics added.
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'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade
to action, not merely to describe facts."
Frankfurter has been the most articulate critic of this hypothesis. It
offends his canons of judicial self-restraint and betrays what he con-
siders to be the Holmes tradition from which it derives. In Kovacs v.
Cooper,12 he took pains to point this up, asserting that the phrase
"preferred position" mischievously infects laws touching communica-
tion with presumptive invalidity. It therefore disregards the "admoni-
tion most to be observed in exercising the Court's reviewing powers
over legislation, 'that it is a constitution we are expounding.' " 11 A
further objection to summarizing Holmes' line of thought by the
phrase "preferred position," he argues, is that it expresses a com-
plicated process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula.
Such a formula makes for mechanical jurisprudence. This belies
Holmes, for "to rest upon a formula is slumber that, prolonged, means
death." 84 Furthermore, Frankfurter argues that Jackson didn't really
subscribe to this view in its most extreme application in Thomas v.
Collins.15 Consequently, it has never fully commended itself to a
majority of the Court. He did, however, list numerous cases wherein
it was employed. It is therefore the more "mischievous because it
radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it" by a convinced
majority. 6 Of this argument Rutledge drily remarked that his brother
Frankfurter "demonstrates the conclusion opposite to that which he
draws, namely, that the First Amendment guaranties . . . occupy
preferred position not only in the Bill of Rights but also in the repeated
decisions of this Court." 87 Certainly with the deaths of Rutledge and
Murphy only Black and Douglas fully subscribe to the rationale of the
Thomas v. Collins opinion. It may be that this opinion marks but a
vigorous mid-point in a cycle of constitutional interpretation now
ended."'
Reading the First Amendment in the light of the premises of his
Thomas v. Collins opinion, Rutledge voted to uphold the rights of free
expression in 79% of the non-unanimous decisions where these rights
82. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
83. Id. at 90.
84. HOLmES, COLLECTD LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1921).
85. See Frankfurter, concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). Jack-
son subsequently confirmed this in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
86. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
87. Id. at 106.
88. The cycle, if such it be, was still near the zenith in the spring of 1949 when
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) was decided. Here the adherence of Reed
created a majority of five to uphold the right to speak under circumstances which ad-
mittedly pressed the guaranty of the First Amendment to its periphery. Jackson, writ-
ing the chief dissent on the substantive issue, believed "there is danger that, if the Court
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the Con-
stitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." Id. at 37.
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were invoked. So did Black and Douglas. Murphy's even greater
sensitivity to any restrictions in this area impelled him to uphold the
rights claimed in 96% of the cases.
Rutledge was particularly insistent that the common-law rule that
criminal statutes be precisely drawn and narrowly construed must be
rigidly applied to legislation affecting civil liberties.89 Speaking for
the minority, he thought that a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance which
forbade the use of sound amplifiers emitting "loud and raucous noises"
was so ambiguously drawn that it would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment even if no question of free speech were involved. He
further felt that no man should be convicted under a law when even a
bare majority of the Supreme Court could not agree as to what was
actually forbidden." Dissenting in United States v. C.LO.,91 he thought
the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act forbidding expenditures by labor
unions "in connection with" any national election was fatally ambig-
uous. "Blurred signposts to criminality will not suffice. . . . Vague-
ness and uncertainty so vast and all-pervasive seeking to restrict or
delimit First Amendment freedoms are wholly at war with the long
established constitutional principles surrounding their delimitation."
The majority had construed that section of the statute as not applying
to expenditures made in connection with the publication of a weekly
periodical, thus scrupulously avoiding the constitutional issue. By
such a construction Rutledge thought his brethren had abdicated their
function of judicial review. To him the Congressional intent was clear,
although the language was ambiguous. He, with Black, Douglas and
Murphy, would have declared that section of the act unconstitutional.
To justify this vigorous exercise of judicial review he reiterated the
doctrine of Tlwmas v. Collins:
".... [W]hen regulation or prohibition touches them [basic
rights] this Court is duty bound to examine the restrictions and to
decide in its own independent judgment whether they are abridged
within the [First] Amendment's meaning. That office cannot be
surrendered to legislative judgment, however weighty, although
such judgment is always entitled to respect.
"As the Court has declared repeatedly, that judgment does not
bear the same weight and is not entitled to the same presumption
of validity, when the legislation . . . restricts the rights of con-
science, expression, and assembly protected by the Amendment,
as are given to other regulations having no such tendency. The
S9. This rule was first recognized by the Court in Ohio ex reL Lloyd v. Dollison,
194 U.S. 445, 450 (1904). It was first invoked to invalidate a statute in International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1941). It has been used in some forty cases
since then, invalidation following in about a third of them. See, further, Note, Due Process
Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HAnv. L. Rsv. 77 (1948).
90. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
91. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
presumption rather is against the legislative intrusion into these
domains." 92
In the Hatch Act case,93 Rutledge forsook the majority, agreeing with
Black that "no statute of Congress has ever before attempted to stifle
the spoken and written political utterances and lawful political ac-
tivities of federal and state employees as a class. . . .The section of
the Act here held valid reduces the constitutionally protected liberty
of several inillion people to less than a shadow of its substance."
Rutledge was also at variance with the majority in the case of a
conscientious objector who was not allowed to practice law in Illinois
because of his scruples against bearing arms.94 And with Black,
Douglas and Murphy he urged that the Schwimmer and Macintosh
cases,95 where conscientious objectors had been refused citizenship for
the same reasons, had been wrongly decided. They were, in fact, over-
ruled the following year."
When a Justice like Rutledge insisted that the Constitution com-
mands meticulous protection for the rights of criminal defendants,
how did he resolve the competing civil libertarian claims where the
criminal defendant is himself accused of depriving a person of his
rights under the Constitution? Where is judicial zeal focused when
two facets of civil liberties compete? Screws v. United States 11 provides
some answers. This inconclusive decision involved the constitu-
tionality and interpretation of Section 20 of the Federal Criminal
Code-that rather hapless legislative attempt preserved from Civil
War days to provide federal protection of civil rights. The defendants
sought reversal of their conviction on the ground that the federal law
invoked against them was too vague and indefinite to provide any
ascertainable standard of guilt. For under our constitutional system
criminal statutes must be specific. A further question concerning the
"willful" intent of the defendants was raised. The case produced four
separate opinions on these questions in no one of which did more than
four justices concur.98
92. Id. at 140. In three other cases Rutledge also protested that vaguely drawn
criminal statutes offended basic rights: Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945),
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948). On the other hand, when indefiniteness of the criminal statute was alleged in
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), he found the language sufficiently precise.
But there the statute was directed at the protection of civil liberties, not at a restriction
of them.
93. United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Douglas
also dissented, in part. Murphy did not participate.
94. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
95. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v. Mn c-
intosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
96. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
97. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
98. For a critical discussion of this case see Carr, Screws v. United States: The
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Although a majority of the Court held the statute constitutional in
face of the argument that it was too vague, five Justices sent the case
back for retrial because they thought the jury had been inadequately
charged on the question of willful intent. Rutledge and Murphy alone
thought both that the statute was constitutional and that the evidence
of willful intent was unequivocal. They thus demonstrated less metic-
ulous solicitude than did their brethren for the rights of defendants
charged with violating the civil rights of another."
In the five cases where Rutledge voted against the right claimed under
the First Amendment, the civil liberty issue was subordinate in his
opinion. Thus he wrote the majority opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts 'l
holding that a state child labor statute can prohibit the sale and distribu-
tion of religious literature by one of Jehovah's Witnesses. Using the
"preferred position" phrase he nevertheless thought the statute jus-
tified by the general interest which the community has in protecting
its youth. He drew an analogy to compulsory school attendance and
vaccination of children which have been consistently sustained regard-
less of religious objections.'' And in United States v. Ballard,'0- Rut-
ledge agreed with the majority that disseminators of religious doctrine
may be punished for using the mails to defraud when clear evidence of
fraudulent intention is disclosed by the record.103 Regulation of the
economic affairs of the press did not invade its freedom under the First
Amendment in Rutledge's opinion. He was willing to apply both the
Sherman Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act to the publishing busi-
ness.10 4 Speaking for the majority, he also remanded a case where
denial of religious liberty was claimed, until the issues were "presented
with clarity, precision and certainty." 105 Murphy and Douglas
thought that the constitutional issue of religious freedom was clear
enough.
Separation of church and state. Although the framers of the initial
words of the First Amendment may have known precisely what they
Georgia Police Brutality Case, 31 CoRaNt. L.Q. 48 (1945); Cohen, The Screws Case:
Federal Protection of Negro Rights, 46 CoiL L. REv. 94 (1946); and KoNvrr, TUE
CoNsvuroN AND CivI RIGHTS 48-61 (1947).
99. Rutledge reluctantly voted to remand the case for retrial, however, in order to
avoid a stalemate in the disposition of the case.
100. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
101. Jackson, in an opinion "dissenting from the grounds of affirmance," used the oc-
casion to analyze the basis of disagreement, as he saw it, among members of the Court
in previous Jehovah's Witnesses cases.
102. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
103. Jackson, curiously enough, was the only one who thought that the religious
freedom of the defendants had been infringed.
104. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), and Oklahoma Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Murphy alone of the Roosevelt appointees
dissented in each case.
105. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
meant by "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion," the members of the Supreme Court cannot agree on it. The
word "establishment" settled a semantic fog over the problem of
banning Caesar from the temple. The question of whether Caesar had
trespassed in the situation presented by Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion 101 was a matter for debate among three different opinions com-
prising a total of almost forty pages. 07 New Jersey had reimbursed
parents from general tax funds for expenses of transporting children to
parochial schools where they received both religious and secular educa-
tion. Black, speaking for Vinson, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy,
thought that this did not constitute "a law respecting an establishment
of religion." Rutledge, writing the-principal dissent with which Frank-
furter, Jackson, and Burton agreed, thought most emphatically that it
did. To the majority,
"[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State.' " 10
But the majority, in spite of this broad dictum, held that the payment
from public funds of transportation expenses of parochial school
pupils did not breach the wall of separation. Admitting that such
payments undoubtedly facilitated attendance at parochial schools,
the majority held that the ordinance "does no more than . . . help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools." The expenditures were
106. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
107. For a discussion of this case and its next of kin, People c.r rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), see Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Col-
stitution, 8 LAw. GuILD Rsv. 387 (1948); Note, Tracing the "Wall": Religion in the
Public School System, 57 YALE L.J. 1114 (1948). For a more extended examination
of the historical background of the problem, see O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCAT10N
UNDER THE CONSTITUnON (1949) and JOHNSON & YosT, SEPARATION OP CIIURCUI AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATEs (1948).
108. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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for a public purpose-to pay the bus fares of all school children, in-
cluding those who attend parochial schools. This was essentially sim-
ilar to "such general government services as ordinary police and fire
protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and
sidewalks" which the parochial schools enjoy. To forbid this "is ob-
viously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of re-
ligious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary." Thus, although "the wall between church and
state .. .must be kept high and impregnable .. .New Jersey has
not breached it here."
To Jackson this was like Lord Byron's Julia, who "whispering 'I
will ne'er consent',-consented." To Rutledge it was worse, for it
placed a less rigid construction on the establishment of religion clause
of the First Amendment than it did on the freedom of religion clause.
The prohibitions of the former, he felt, should be no less broadly en-
forced than the latter."9 To support this position he reviewed the
historical evidence, particularly Madison's views on the subject, for
"irrefutable confirmation of the Amendment's history." 110 From this
he concluded that the authors of the First Amendment-again, par-
ticularly Madison--condemned "support" for religion by use of the
taxing power after the fashion of the New Jersey ordinance. And
"support" of this kind constitutes a "law respecting an establishment
of religion."
Rutledge disagreed fundamentally, therefore, with the majority
thesis that the Amendment merely "requires the state to be a neutral
in its relations with" religion. Neutrality, like the farmer's daughter,
is subject to seduction. "Public money devoted to payment of re-
ligious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings
too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any." "
Since neutrality as applied by the majority provides no logical stopping
point, it infringes the basic principle of separation. Therefore the de-
sign of the framers "was broader than separating church and state in
this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by compre-
hensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion
... in any guise, form, or degree." 112
However, the historical evidence on which Rutledge based his position
is more equivocal than his reading of it admitted. The theme of most
109. "We should not be less strict to keep strong and untarnished the one side of the
shield of religious freedom than we have been of the other." Id. at 63.
110. "No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the
refined product and the terse summation of that history." Id. at 33.
111. Id. at 53.
112. Id. at 31-3.
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state constitutional provisions relating to the separation of church and
state, framed prior to the First Amendment, was simply a prohibition
against preference for a particular sect." 3 Madison in his Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment in Virginia did assert
"that in matters of Religion no man's right is abridged by the institu-
tion of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance." 114 Rutledge relied heavily on such passages from Mad-
ison's writings as indicative of the views of the primary author of the
First Amendment. But Madison was objecting simply to making the
Christian religion the established religion of the state of Virginia. It
is by no means clear that tax support of the kind provided by New
Jersey meant "establishment" to either Madison or Jefferson whose
views the dissenting opinion invokes at length. Both men as President
used tax funds for chaplains in Congress, the armed forces, and for
religious education among the Indians. 15
Insofar as the historical evidence is concerned, it would appear that
the intent of the framers is inconclusive with respect to the issue pre-
sented in the Everson case. Probably no clear intent is demonstrable
beyond the broad concept that Caesar remain aloof from the affairs of
the deity. How aloof is not revealed as unequivocally as Rutledge's
argument claimed. Thus the intent of the framers, while relevant, is
not the only key to the semantic puzzle of a "law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion." As Jackson with characteristic candor observed
a year later, "It is idle to pretend that . . . we can find in the Con-
stitution one word to help us as judges decide where the secular ends
and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in
any other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but
our prepossessions." 1I
In McCollum v. Board of Education 17 Black applied the broad
dictum of his majority opinion in the Everson case to forbid the ver-
sion of "released time" religious instruction in the public schools
adopted by the Board of Education of Champaign, Illinois. The use of
tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close coopera-
tion between school authorities and a local religious council was held
to integrate the state's compulsory education system with sectarian
religious education so closely as to fall under the ban of the First
Amendment. Rutledge's strong dissenting opinion in the Everson case
113. See Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REv. 387,
388-9.
114. The remonstrance is set forth as an appendix to Rutledge's Ezcrson dissent. The
quotation is from paragraph 1.
115. See O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949) for a
vigorous attack on the accuracy of Rutledge's historical interpretation.
116. People ex tel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (con-
curring opinion).
117. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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was probably not without influence, for all but Reed agreed in con-
demning the Champaign plan. Frankfurter, in an opinion concurring
with the majority, emphasized that "released time" programs vary
among the many communities where they are employed, and that
some may be constitutionally "unexceptionable." Thus "the formula-
tion of a relevant Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solu-
tion of a problem, not its answer. . . . We do not attempt to weigh
in the Constitutional scale every separate detail or various combination
of factors which may establish a valid 'released time' program." With
this as well as with the majority opinion Rutledge concurred 118
Civil Liberties in Wartime. In the wartime cases affecting civil
liberties (excepting the cases on Hawaiian martial law, Japanese war
criminals, and denaturalization which are discussed elsewhere) Rut-
ledge voted with the majority supporting the government in all but
two actions-one involving treason, the other, sedition."' In only one,
.-lirabayashi v. United States,120 did he express himself separately. This
was the first of three cases to reach the Court involving the Army's
program of curfew, evacuation to inland areas, and subsequent reloca-
tion for persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast. A
unanimous Court, bypassing the evacuation issue, upheld the curfew
order as an emergency war measure. Rutledge wanted to be sure that
the door would remain open for future judicial review of such action.
He concurred "except for the possible suggestion . . . that the Courts
have no power to review any action a military officer may 'in his dis-
cretion' find it necessary to take with respect to civilian citizens in
military areas." The evacuation program itself was reviewed in
Korematsu v. United States 121 and upheld, although not without
pointed warnings from the Court of the dangers of race discrimination.
Rutledge was again with the majority, but Murphy was not satisfied
that the plea of public necessity urged by the military authorities was
sufficiently demonstrated to justify the ugly racism and guilt by
heredity which permeated the program. -1 22 In neither of these cases
118. The case produced four separate opinions: Black's opinion for the majority;
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in which Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton joined, a con-
curring opinion by Jackson, and Reed's lone dissent.
119. For a general discussion of these cases see Fraenkel, War, Civil Liberties and
the Supreme Court, 55 YALE L.J. 715 (1946).
120. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
121. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
122. Roberts and Jackson also dissented. At the same time a unanimous Court held
that loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry could not be detained against their vill in the
relocation centers to which they bad been evacuated from the West Coast. Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
For a critical analysis of these three cases on the treatment of Japanese-Americans
see Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE LJ. 489 (1945);
Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and .filitary Judgment: the Supreme Court's Korcmalms
and Endo Decisions, 45 Cor. L. REv. 175 (1945) ; KoNvrrz, THE AUN AND Tim AsiTic ir;
AmymICAN LAW (1946); Couwir, ToTAL ,VAR AND THE CoNsrrrutboN 91-100 (1947).
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did the Court apply the clear and present danger test, nor did
Rutledge take exception to this, acquiescing, instead, in the more
latitudinarian rule of reasonableness of the governmental action in the
light of the war emergency.
In the two treason cases which came before the Court, Rutledge
voted with the majority against conviction in the first 123 on the basis
of what the four dissenters 124 called an "ultra-rigid test" as to the
nature of the overt acts necessary to spell out treason. He was also
with the majority in upholding the conviction in the second case two
years later,12 1 Murphy registering the only dissent. In I-artzel v.
United States,126 Rutledge voted with a majority of five to reverse the
conviction of a Nazi protagonist on the ground that willful intent-
required by the Espionage Act under which Hartzel was convicted by
the trial court-had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Although he voted against the government's contention in only two
of these five cases Rutledge, nevertheless, was more favorably disposed
to the civil liberties claims than either Douglas or Black. For Douglas
voted against the government's contention in none, and Black only
in the Cramer case. Murphy, on the other hand, upheld the claim of
the individual in all but the Hirabayashi case and rejected it there only
with grave reservations.
Deportation and Denaturalization. The right of aliens and natural-
ized citizens to enjoy the maximum security against the threat of de-
portation occupied a high place in Rutledge's conception of civil lib-
erties. 12 7 Participating in six cases involving these issues, he voted
against the government's contention in all of them. Of the other
Justices, only Murphy was like-minded. The only instance in which
Rutledge was not in entire agreement with him was when the gov-
ernment's hoary struggle to deport Harry Bridges came up for review
in 1945.12 To Murphy the deportation statute itself was unconstitu-
tional, first, because it rested on the principle of guilt by association,
and second, because it did not meet the clear and present danger test.
Rutledge was content to join the majority opinion which construed
the statute as not applying to Bridges. 1 9
123. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
124. Douglas wrote the dissent. Stone, Black and Reed concurred.
125. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
126. 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
127. For a careful discussion of these issues see KONviTZ, TH- ALIEN AND VIE ASIATIC
iN AmERICAN LAw (1946), especially cc. 2 and 4.
128. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
129. The only other deportation case in which Rutledge participated was Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). There a majority refused to disturb an order deporting
a German enemy alien on the grounds that under the circumstances the finding of the
Attorney General was not subject to judicial review, and that the termination of the war
was a question for the political branch of the government, not for the courts, to decide.
The four dissenters would have been less sparing of judicial review. Black thought that
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In considering the validity of denaturalization proceedings the
Supreme Court has framed the general principle that if it can be
proved that the defendant took his oath of attachment to the United
States Constitution with mental reservations at the time he secured
his naturalization certificate, his citizenship may be cancelled for
fraud. 3" In the denaturalization cases decided since 1943 Rutledge
took a position fully shared only by Murphy. It amounts to this:
first, at the very least a denaturalization action should be regarded as
imposing the most severe kind of punishment. Therefore such a pro-
ceeding requires all the safeguards of criminal procedure provided by
the Bill of Rights. Second, under the Constitution, Congress itself
probably does not have the power to denaturalize by "any process
which takes away . . . citizenship for causes or by procedures not
applicable to native-born citizens . .. In my opinion, the power to
naturalize is not the power to denaturalize. The act of admission must
be taken as final, for any cause that may have existed at that time." 131
Both these points require comment. The second contention comes
very close to denying that Congress enjoys the power of denaturaliza-
tion at all. For the circumstances under which native-born citizens
may be deprived of all their rights of citizenship, and these alone, are
difficult to imagine. This contention stems obviously from the belief
that the government must deal with the transgressions of naturalized
citizens-whatever they may be-in the same ways as it does with
those of the native-born. To employ any other standard places nat-
uralized citizens "in a separate and inferior class." Against this status
of "second-class citizens" for those who have acquired rather than
inherited citizenship Rutledge consistently protested. In Schneider-
manz v. United States 132 he observed, "If this is the law and the right the
naturalized citizen acquires, his admission creates nothing more than
citizenship in attenuated, if not suspended, animation. .. . It may
be doubted that the framers . . . intended to create tvo classes of
citizens, one free and independent, one haltered with a lifetime string
tied to its status." 133
insofar as deportation of enemy aliens was concerned the war should be considered as
terminated by 1948. Douglas would have e.xamined the findings of the Attorney General
since he saw no difference; for the purpose of judicial review, between the deportation
of enemy aliens and any other deportation proceeding. They are both subject to the
same-due process requirements or reasonable notice and hearing. Rutledge, %vith Murphy,
concurred in both of these dissents.
130. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
131. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654,677-8 (1946).
13Z 320 U.S. 118, 165 (1943) (concurring opinion).
133. Cf. Marshall's statement in 1824, "A naturalized citizen becomes a member of
sodety,'possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing in view of the Con-
stitution, on the footing of the native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress
to enlarge or abridge these rights." Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
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But in the Schneiderman case Rutledge did not embrace this second
contention, for he there conceded "that the power to revoke exists and
rightly should exist to some extent. . . ." "I Three years later, how-
ever, in Knauer v. United States,'35 he based his dissenting opinion
partly on the view that "the power to naturalize is not the power to
denaturalize." Only Murphy agreed with this.
Since the Court has not accepted the second contention, 3 ' Rutledge
insisted on the first as affording the minimal standard of protection for
naturalized citizens. Thus in the most recent of these cases, Klapprolt
v. United States, 137 he asserted:
"If in deference to the Court's rulings we are to continue to have
two classes of citizens in this country . . . I cannot assent to the
idea that the ordinary rules of procedure in civil causes afford
any standard sufficient to safeguard the status given to naturalized
citizens. . . . Regardless of the name given to it, the denaturali-
zation proceeding when it is successful has all the consequences and
effects of a penal or criminal conviction, except that the ensuing
liability for deportation is a greater penalty than is generally in-
flicted for crime.
"To treat a denaturalization proceeding . . . as if it were noth-
ing more than a suit for damages for breach of contract . . .
ignores, in my view, every consideration of justice and reality con-
cerning the substance of the suit and what is at stake.
"To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less
precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today compre-
hends those rights and almost all others. Yet by the device or
label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of
criminal procedure safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, this most
comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held, can be
taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of
banishment." 138
The majority opinions in these two cases as well as the intervening
case of Baumgartner v. United States 139 had insisted that evidence of
134. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 167 (1943).
135. 328 U.S. 654 (1946).
136. The Court has derived the power to denaturalize from the constitutional grant
of power to Congress "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" (Art. I, § 8)
plus the "necessary and proper" clause. See Douglas' majority opinion in the Knatcr
case.
137. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
138. Id. at 619, 616-17. Murphy agreed. This view Rutledge had previously pressed
in the Schneiderman case and in his dissent in the Knauter case.
139. 322 U.S. 665 (1944). Here a unanimous Court followed the rule of the
Schneiderman case in setting aside a denaturalization order of a Nazi sympathizer for
lack of unequivocal evidence that the naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently.
Black, Douglas and Rutledge joined a concurring opinion by Murphy emphasizing the
"patent" lack of such evidence.
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fraud in obtaining naturalization must be "clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing." By thus requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt the
Court had in effect applied the standards of a criminal proceeding to
denaturalization actions. Only in the Knauer case did the majority
think this standard was sufficiently met to permit denaturalization.140
But in all three cases Rutledge thought the standards of criminal pro-
ceedings should have been applied more explicitly. And in the Klapp-
rott case he thought that the standards applied in the three previous
cases had been diluted.' 4' In this he expressed the same insistence
pressed in the John L. Lewis contempt case,142 that accusations which
in fact entail punishment be clothed with the procedural guaranties
of the Sixth Amendment.
To sum up, Rutledge next to Murphy was the most consistent
champion of substantive civil liberties on the Court. Although agree-
ing substantially with Black and Douglas, he went much further than
they have gone in supporting individual rights in deportation and de-
naturalization proceedings. Rutledge also went further than Black
and Douglas with respect to the separation of church and state. To
him the First Amendment forbade in absolute terms even indirect, non-
preferential forms of public aid to religious activity of any kind.
In the wartime cases involving Japanese-Americans, treason, and
sedition he voted against the government contention in only two out of
five cases-one treason and one sedition case. Nevertheless, he was
on the side of protecting individual rights more than any of the present
Justices in these cases. Only when he assented to the government's
questionable treatment of the Japanese-Americans on the West Coast
did he depart from his otherwise consistently rigid standard of judg-
ment in civil liberties issues. There, the standard to which he assented
was the reasonableness of governmental action in the context of the
war emergency rather than the strict version of the clear and present
danger rule as in Thomas v. Collins. 14 3 His position in these cases
marked also an ad hwc departure from his usual view that governmental
action intruding on rights which occupy a preferred position in the
scale of constitutional values is presumptively invalid.
140. Douglas for the majority declared "there is solid and comvincing evidence
that... when he [Knauer] foreswore allegiance to the German Reich he swore falsely."
Black, in a concurring opinion, was satisfied "beyond all reasonable doubt' that Knauer
obtained his citizenship fraudulently.
141. The Court granted a hearing on the merits of a denaturalization judgment which
had been rendered by default against the petitioner without requiring proof of the allega-
tion or benefit of counsel. Under his standard Rutledge thought that the complaint
should have been dismissed. furphy was of the same opinion.
142. United States v. United Mline Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
143. 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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CONCLUSION
Where the basic values of democratic life were concerned Rutledge's
interest in a pragmatic adjustment of competing claims evaporated.
If, as he once observed, federalism was the unique institutional core
of American democracy, 144 the rights of persons provided the human
core. They transcended all else. Nothing less than a rigorous protec-
tion of all personal rights on a uniform national scale would satisfy his
interpretation of the constitutional mandates. Thus he voted to up-
hold the claim of personal rights in 84% of all the non-unanimous deci-
sions involving civil liberties-including both procedural and substan-
tive ones. Excluding the war cases, he so voted in 87% of the cases.
Although he consistently asserted that the guaranties of the First
Amendment occupied a preferred position, this did not mean that he
thought guaranties of procedural rights occupied a deferred position.
As a matter of cold statistics he voted to uphold the claim of criminal
defendants in 91% of all the non-unanimous decisions involving pro-
cedural rights. When rights guaranteed by the First Amendment were
involved, he voted to uphold the right in 79% of the non-unanimous
decisions. These figures alone would therefore imply a preferred posi-
tion in his mind for procedural rights. This, of course, is deceptive.
There was no hierarchy of values among civil liberties for Rutledge.
They were all primary, for they were all bulwarks of human dignity.
To Rutledge, the vast expansion of governmental power in social
and economic matters required correspondingly greater protection of
civil liberties. The impact of the massive political community on in-
dividuality must be cushioned by comprehensive safeguards of per-
sonal liberty if the promises of democratic life are to remain meaning-
ful. Big government can remain healthy only if civil liberties are
rigorously protected. Thus he contributed as forcefully as anyone to
the recent trend of the Court in practicing judicial self-restraint where
economic and social legislation is involved. But when fundamental
democratic values are at stake, he asserted in Thomas v. Collins, this
"presents a question this Court cannot escape answering independ-
ently, whatever the legislative judgment." 141 To him the protection
of personal liberty was the most vital responsibility of the Court.
Concerning issues of free speech, press, and religion, Rutledge's basic
premises as well as his voting record were virtually identical with those
of Black, Douglas and Murphy. This solid minority of four had been
able to enlist the sporadic support of either Reed or Jackson to give
them majority status from time to time. Black and Douglas are now
in a virtually hopeless minority position. Their premises will control
decision in civil liberties cases only if they can enlist the adherence of
three other Justices. Reed, Jackson, Clark, and Minton are the most
144. RUTLEDGE, A DEcLRTioN oF LEGAL FAITH 75-6 (1947).
145. 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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possible candidates. But that any three of them will be so persuaded
seems unlikely. It would thus appear that the 1948 term of the Su-
preme Court marked the end, for a while at least, of an expanding
definition of civil liberties.
The death of Justice Rutledge all but marks the passing of what came
to be known as the Roosevelt Court. However the future lines may be
drawn, his opinions will be a persistent force in the evolving experiment
of democratic living.
